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WHY THE SUPREME COURT
WAS WRONG ABOUT THE SOLOMON
AMENDMENT
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*

F

rom the first week of law school, I try to teach my students that a
decision from the Supreme Court is not necessarily right and that
they, and everyone, should feel free to disagree with the Court. They
should do so even when the Court is unanimous. I was reminded of
this lesson when the Court, by an 8-0 margin, upheld the
constitutionality of a federal law that requires law schools to allow
military recruiters on campus. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights (FAIR),1 the Supreme Court upheld the
Solomon Amendment,2 which provides that if any part of an
institution of higher learning denies military recruiters access equal
to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution will lose
federal funds.3
The Court’s ruling means that law schools now must give
preferred status to the military.4 The schools may bar any other

Copyright © 2006 Erwin Chemerinsky and Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy.
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. It should be
disclosed that I was a named plaintiff in the lawsuit that is the focus of this Article, Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
1. 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
2. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
3. Id.
4. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (stating that the Solomon Amendment requires schools to
treat the military like other employers).
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employer that discriminates on the basis of race, gender, religion or
sexual orientation, but may not exclude the United States military.
This principle undermines the freedom of speech and freedom of
association of law schools across the country that do not wish to
facilitate further discrimination against some of their students.
Law schools long have had policies excluding from career service
facilities employers who discriminate on the basis of race, gender,
religion, or sexual orientation. Because a federal statute excludes
gays and lesbians from military service,5 most law schools refused to
allow the military to use career service offices. However, a federal
statute, referred to as the “Solomon Amendment,” was enacted 1995.6
It provides that educational institutions will lose virtually all federal
funds if any part of the university denies military recruiters access
equal to that provided other recruiters.7
Thus, the issue in Rumsfeld v. FAIR was whether the Solomon
Amendment violates the First Amendment rights of law schools and
their faculty and students.8 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court rejected the constitutional challenge and upheld the law.9
My thesis in this Article is that the Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v.
FAIR abandoned basic First Amendment principles. The decision
cannot be reconciled with other cases concerning freedom of speech
and association. Indeed, if followed, Rumsfeld v. FAIR sets a
disturbing and dangerous precedent.

5. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). The Supreme Court correctly described this statute as providing
that “a person generally may not serve in the Armed Forces if he has engaged in homosexual acts,
stated that he is a homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.” FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1303.
6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558, 108
Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994) codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
7. Id.
8. 126 S. Ct. at 1302.
9. Id. at 1306.
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Part I of the Article briefly describes the Solomon Amendment
and the history of the litigation over it. Part II describes the Supreme
Court’s decision and explains how it is inconsistent with longstanding First Amendment principles. Finally, Part III suggests that
the decision must be understood as part of the Supreme Court’s
historic—and misguided—deference to the military, especially in
wartime. I also discuss what happens now that this battle in the fight
for equality has been lost.
At the outset, I should admit that I am hardly disinterested when
it comes to this issue. I am a member of the board of directors of the
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights and a named plaintiff
in Rumsfeld v. FAIR. I am enormously proud to have been in this
role. As a law school faculty member, I believe that law schools
should refuse to allow any employer that discriminates based on race,
gender, religion, or sexual orientation from using its career service
facilities. All of my students should have equal access to all who
interview on campus, and any employer who discriminates based on
invidious characteristics should not be able to have the advantages of
using law school facilities. A law firm that refuses to hire AfricanAmerican or Jewish or women students should be unwelcome, as
should any employer that refuses to hire gays or lesbians. In part,
this is about ensuring fairness to all of our students. But also,
because law schools are in the business of training future lawyers, we
should be teaching a lesson of equality and non-discrimination. The
example law schools set can be a powerful message that
discrimination is wrong and unacceptable.
That it is the federal government, through a federal statute,
excluding gays and lesbians from the military, makes it all the more
important that law schools refuse to be a party to the discrimination.
The federal law is based on the premise that there is something
H 261 I

04__CHEMERINSKY.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:40:24 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

wrong with gays and lesbians and that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is acceptable.10 Law schools must, in every way
possible, say that this is unconscionable and that they will not be a
part of facilitating the federal government’s continued unacceptable
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
I
THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT AND THE CHALLENGE TO IT
Beginning in the 1970s, law schools began to adopt policies to
exclude from school facilities employers who discriminate on the
basis of race, gender, or religion. In 1990, the American Association
of Law Schools, the governing and accrediting body for law schools,
voted unanimously to include sexual orientation among the types of
prohibited discrimination.11
As a result of such policies, many law schools barred the military
from using their placement facilities because a federal statute
excludes gays and lesbians from service in the military.12 Schools
varied in the extent of their exclusion, but most law schools restricted
the ability of military recruiters to use law school career services
offices because of the military’s express policy of discrimination
based on sexual orientation.13 The military could interview students

10. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (outlining reasons for the military’s policy against
homosexuality).
11. See American Academy of Law Schools, Executive Committee Regulations 6-3.2(a)
(2004), available at http://www.aals.org/ecr (stating that “a member school . . . shall require
employers . . . to provide an assurance of the employer’s willingness to observe the principals of
equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-3(b)”).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
13. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.Supp.2d
269, 282 (D. N.J. 2003) (“Law schools are loathe to endorse or assist in recruiting efforts of the
United States military because of its policy against homosexual activity.”).
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off-campus, or at campus ROTC offices, but not within law school
facilities.
In response to the law schools’ exclusion of the military, in 1994
New York Congressman Gerald Solomon proposed an amendment
to the annual defense appropriations bill that would withhold
Department of Defense funding from any educational institution
that excluded the military from using school facilities for recruiting
purposes.14 This proposal was adopted by both the House and Senate
and signed into law.15
In 2001, following the events of September 11, under the more
conservative Bush administration, the Department of Defense
informed law schools of their requirement to allow military
recruiters access equal to all other employers or their universities
would face the loss of all federal funds.16 In the summer of 2004,
Congress codified this policy in a statute which provides that law
schools and their universities face loss of federal funds, unless
military recruiters are given access “in a manner that is at least equal
in quality and scope to the [degree of] access to campuses and to
students that is provided to any other employer.”17

14. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, H.R. 2401, 103rd Cong. § 571
(1993) (enacted).
15. Id.
16. See FAIR, 291 F.Supp.2d at 282 (citing record evidence).
17. Ronald Reagan Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 198-375, §
552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (Supp. 2005). As the Supreme
Court explained:
The federal funds covered by the Solomon Amendment are specified at 10 U.S.C. §
983(d)(1) (Supp. 2005) and include funding from the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Nuclear Security
Administration of the Department of Energy. Funds provided for student financial
assistance are not covered. § 983(d)(2). The loss of funding applies not only to the
particular school denying access but university wide. § 983(b).
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A lawsuit challenging the Solomon Amendment was brought by
an association of law schools and law faculty, the Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights. Plaintiffs also included two law
professors, Sylvia Law, of New York University, and myself, then of
the University of Southern California. Three law students were also
named as plaintiffs in the lawsuit.18
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied the petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and denied
the government’s motion to dismiss.19 In November 2004, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
decision to deny the petitioner’s preliminary injunction motion.20
The Third Circuit premised its decision on the principle that the
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutional protected interests—especially, his
interest in freedom of speech.”21 This doctrine, often called “the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” is firmly established.22 Surely,
the government could not condition welfare benefits on a
requirement that recipients refrain from criticizing the government.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1304 n.3
(2006).
18. The Supreme Court found that FAIR had standing and thus concluded that it did not
need to consider the standing of the other plaintiffs. Id. at 1303 n.2.
19. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
20. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3rd
Cir. 2004).
21. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
22. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (holding that the
specific interests sought to be advanced by a ban on editorializing were either not sufficiently
substantial or not served in a sufficiently limited manner to justify the abridgment of journalistic
freedoms which the First Amendment protects); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958)
(holding that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general
taxing program, the State must come forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition, or a
compelling interest at stake as to justify a procedure which results in suppressing protected
speech).
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Nor, the Third Circuit concluded, should the government be able to
condition federal funds on a requirement that law schools forego
their First Amendment rights.23
The Third Circuit found that the Solomon Amendment violates
the First Amendment rights of law schools in two major ways.24
First, law schools are being compelled to express a message with
which they strongly disagree. The Supreme Court long has
recognized that in addition to preventing suppression of speech, “the
First Amendment may prevent the government from . . . compelling
individuals to express certain views.”25 The Solomon Amendment
does exactly that. It forces law schools to express a message about the
presence of the military and its recruiters. Law schools must
announce the military’s recruitment via e-mails, flyers, and posters.
Additionally, law schools must include the military in recruitment
forums and programs.
The Third Circuit found a second, separate constitutional
violation: the Solomon Amendment violates law schools’ freedom of
association.26 The Supreme Court long has held that groups that
have an expressive message may exclude in furtherance of it.27 Law
schools have an expressive message that is against discrimination,
and in furtherance of that message, they have the right to refuse to
associate with those who discriminate based on sexual orientation
and other invidious characteristics.
23. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 246.
24. Id. at 230.
25. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (citing, inter alia, W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634, 639–43 (1943)).
26. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 235.
27. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (quoting Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)) (noting that protection of the right to expressive
association “is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding
dissident expression from suppression by the majority”).
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II
WHY THE SUPREME COURT WAS WRONG
In a unanimous opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts,
the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the Solomon
Amendment.28 The Court concluded that neither of the First
Amendment grounds found by the Third Circuit had any merit.29
Interestingly, the Court said that there was no need for it to
consider whether there was an unconstitutional condition because
Congress would have the authority to directly compel universities to
allow the military to recruit on campuses.30 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote:
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “provide for
the common Defence,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” and
“[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.” Congress’ power in
this area “is broad and sweeping,” and there is no dispute in
this case that it includes the authority to require campus
access for military recruiters. That is, of course, unless
Congress exceeds constitutional limitations on its power in
enacting such legislation.31
The Court said, though, that “[u]nder this principle, known as
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Solomon Amendment
would be unconstitutional if Congress could not directly require
universities to provide military recruiters equal access to their
In other words, the Court reaffirmed the
students.”32
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and said that the issue was
whether the requirement of military access violated the First

28. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1301,
1313 (2006).
29. Id. at 1313.
30. Id. at 1306.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1307.
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Amendment. Subsequently, the Court proceeded to reject each of
the First Amendment claims that had been accepted by the Third
Circuit.33
A. Compelled Speech
First, the Court rejected that there was any compelled speech.34
Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[t]he Solomon Amendment
does not require any . . . expression by law schools . . . . There is
nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or
motto that the school must endorse.”35 The Court explained that
students surely could understand that schools were not endorsing the
military or its exclusion of gays and lesbians.36 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote: “We have held that high school students can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school
permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access
policy. Surely students have not lost that ability by the time they get
to law school.”37
The Court stressed that law schools were still free to express their
own views, even though they had to allow the military on campus to
use career service facilities. Chief Justice Roberts explained: “The
Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools may say nor
requires them to say anything. Law schools remain free under the
statute to express whatever views they may have on the military’s

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1307.
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congressionally mandated employment policy, all the while retaining
eligibility for federal funds.”38
There are two flaws in the Court’s reasoning here, one factual and
one legal. The factual error is in concluding that law schools are not
required by the Solomon Amendment to engage in expression. Law
schools are required to disseminate literature in student mailboxes;
post job announcements on bulletin boards; maintain leaflets in
binders for reference by students; publish précis in printed catalogs;
e-mail students about interview possibilities; arrange appointments
for students; supply private meeting rooms for discussion with
candidates; reserve spots at private forums; and potentially post “JAG
Corps” banners.39 All of this is speech activity that is compelled by
the Solomon Amendment.40
The Court’s legal error is even more serious. Never before has
the Supreme Court said that compelled speech is permissible so long
as the speaker is allowed to disavow the forced message and engage
in other speech. The classic case concerning compelled speech was
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which declared
unconstitutional a state law that required that children salute the
flag.41 Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the Court, eloquently said:
The compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind. . . . If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,

38. Id. at 1308.
39. This non-inclusive list is based on the author’s experience with employer recruiting at
law schools.
40. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1).
41. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.42

The Court followed this principle in other cases, such as in
Wooley v. Maynard, where it ruled that an individual could not be
punished for blocking out the portion of his automobile license plate
that contained the New Hampshire state motto, “Live Free or Die.”43
The Court said that:
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all. The right to speak and
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of “individual freedom
of mind.”44
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California, the Court declared unconstitutional a
utility commission regulation that required that a private utility
company include in its billing envelopes materials prepared by a
public interest group.45 The utility commission sought to provide a
more balanced presentation of views on energy issues;46 the public
interest group’s statements were to be a counterpoint to the
statements by the utility companies.47 But the Court found that such
compelled access violated the First Amendment. Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, said that “[c]ompelled access like that ordered
in this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 633, 642.
430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986).
Id. at 5–7.
Id. at 9.
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and forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda
they do not set.”48
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston also involved an issue of forced expression.49 Every St.
Patrick’s Day, the Veterans Council, a private group, organizes a
parade in Boston.50 The Veterans Council refused to allow the IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston to participate
in its parade.51 The Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group sued in Massachusetts state court based on the state’s public
accommodations law that prohibited discrimination by business
establishments on the basis on sexual orientation.52
The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided with the Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group.53
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, said that organizing a parade
is inherently expressive activity and that it violated the First
Amendment to force the organizers to include messages that they
find inimical.54 Justice Souter explained that compelling the Veterans
Council to include the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group “violates the fundamental rule . . . under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content
of his own message.”55

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 572.
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The Court expressly invoked the principle discussed above that
there is a First Amendment right not to speak. Justice Souter wrote
that “the Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like
from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to
invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by
speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.”56
It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rumsfeld v. FAIR with these decisions. In none of them did the
Court say, as it did in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, that the ability of the speaker
to engage in other speech allowed the government to compel
expression. Nor did the Court say, as it did in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, that
the ability of the audience to recognize that it was compelled speech
made it permissible.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court did
not say that compelled flag salutes were permissible simply because
the students were able to present alternative viewpoints.57 Nor in
Wooley v. Maynard was the required phrase on the license plate
allowed just because the driver could put a bumper sticker on his car
protesting the compelled message or just because those seeing the
license plate would know that the slogan was there because of the
state’s compelled speech.58 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, the Court held that a state agency
cannot require a utility company to include a third-party newsletter
in its billing envelope, even though the utility company could express
its own message of disagreement with the compelled speech.59 In
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 575.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986).
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the compelled speech was not excused because the parade organizers
could have spoken out against the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
group.60
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, if followed, would eliminate the principle that
compelled speech violates the First Amendment. Instead, it would
substitute the view that the government can compel speech so long as
the speaker than can disagree with the forced message. This is not
only a radical departure from precedent, but also highly undesirable.
As the Supreme Court has held for decades, the First Amendment’s
protection of freedom of speech also includes a right to not speak.61
Allowing the government to compel speech, under the assumption
that the speaker can then disagree with its message, dissolves one’s
right to not speak. That right is precious under an Amendment that
guarantees freedom of conscience.
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion also attempted to
distinguish the cases by stating:
The compelled speech violation in each of our prior cases,
however, resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s
own message was affected by the speech it was forced to
accommodate. . . . In this case, accommodating the military’s
message does not affect the law schools’ speech, because the
schools are not speaking when they host interviews and
recruiting receptions.62

But this is just wrong. Under the Solomon Amendment, law
schools are required to disseminate literature in student mailboxes

60. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
61. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 9 (noting that “the essential thrust of the First
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas. . . .
There is necessarily . . . a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same
ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect” (citations omitted)).
62. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1309
(2006).

H 272 I

04__CHEMERINSKY.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:40:24 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

that they would not have to put there otherwise. They must post job
announcements on bulletin boards that otherwise would not be
there. They must e-mail students about interview possibilities and
arrange appointments for students. They must allow the military to
participate in employment forums held by them, and they must allow
the military to display its banners.
The irony the Court never acknowledges is that in all of the prior
cases the Supreme Court rejected the government’s power to require
equal access. In Hurley, for example, the Court said that the
government could not require that the parade organizers allow the
gay and lesbian group to march in the same way as other groups.63
But in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Court said that the government can
force law schools to give the military preferred access.64 Any other
employer who discriminates based on sexual orientation can be
excluded, but not the military.
B. Freedom of Association
Second, the Court rejected the claim that the Solomon
Amendment interfered with law schools’ freedom of association.65
The Court said that its earlier decisions concerning freedom of
association involved the ability of a group to exclude certain people
from membership, but the Solomon Amendment had nothing to do
with membership.66 Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Unlike the public
accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not
force a law school ‘to accept members it does not desire.’”67 The

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
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Court again emphasized that there is not a violation of the First
Amendment because “[s]tudents and faculty are free to associate to
voice their disapproval of the military’s message.”68
But on careful consideration, the Court’s distinctions to Dale
should not make a difference. As the Court recognized, Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale is the key case here.69 In Dale, in a 5 to 4 decision,
the Court held that freedom of association protects the Boy Scouts’
right to exclude gays in violation of a state’s antidiscrimination
statute.70 Dale was a lifelong Scout who had reached the rank of
Eagle Scout and had become an assistant scoutmaster.71 While in
college he became involved in gay rights activities. Dale was quoted
in a newspaper article after attending a seminar on the psychological
needs of gay and lesbian teenagers and was identified in the article as
the co-president of the Gay/Lesbian Alliance at Rutgers University.72
A scout official saw this article and then sent Dale a letter, excluding
him from further participation in the Scouts.73
Dale sued under the New Jersey law that prohibits discrimination
by places of public accommodation.74 The New Jersey Supreme
Court found that the Boy Scouts are a “public accommodation”
within the meaning of the law and rejected the Boy Scouts’ claim that
freedom of association protected their right to discriminate based on
sexual orientation.75

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1313.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 643.
N.J. Stat Ann. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000).
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999).
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The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Boy Scouts’
desire to exclude gays fits within either of the exceptions recognized
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.76 Since the Boy Scouts are a large
national organization, they could not realistically claim to be an
“intimate association.” Instead, they argued that they had an
expressive message that was anti-gay and that forcing them to
include homosexuals undermined this communicative goal.77
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion acknowledged that
“[o]bviously, the Scout Oath and Law do not expressly mention
sexuality or sexual orientation.”78 But Chief Justice Rehnquist was
willing to find such a goal based on the Boy Scouts’ interpretation of
its own words, such as its command that scouts be “morally straight,”
and from the position it had taken during litigation.79
In other words, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
essentially held that a group could define its own expressive message
during litigation.80 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the failure to
clearly state such a communicative goal in advance is not
determinative: “The fact that the organization does not trumpet its
views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks,
does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
protection.”81

76. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–59. See also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984) (noting that the government may seek to impose limitations on a group’s
freedom of association by imposing penalties or withholding benefits because of their
membership in a disfavored group; it may attempt to require disclosure of the fact of membership
in a group seeking anonymity; or, it may try to interfere with the internal organization or affairs
of the group) (internal citations omitted).
77. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (No. 99-699).
78. 530 U.S. at 650.
79. Id. at 650–51.
80. Id. at 656.
81. Id.
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The analogy to Rumsfeld v. FAIR is powerful. Forced association
that interferes with an organization’s expressive message was found
to violate the First Amendment.82 The fact that the Boy Scouts could
find other ways to express their anti-gay message was not enough to
allow forced association.83 Nor should it matter whether the forced
association was in the form of membership or other means. It is the
compelled association, and not its specific form, that is objectionable
under the First Amendment.
If followed, Rumsfeld v. FAIR would dramatically change the law.
It would limit protection of freedom of association to the
membership context. Moreover, it would mean that the government
could compel association, so long as the individual or institution
could express its disagreement with the mandate.
Simply put, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court held that
the government could not compel association in a manner that is
inconsistent with a group’s expressive message.84 But the Solomon
Amendment does just this. No one disputes the fact that law schools
have an expressive message of disapproving discrimination.
III
WHY AND WHAT NOW?
My primary focus thus far has been in demonstrating that
Rumsfeld v. FAIR was a significant departure from well-established
First Amendment principles. I believe that understanding the
decision requires seeing it as part of the Court’s historical deference

82. Id. at 659.
83. Id. at 656–59.
84. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312
(2006).
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to the military, especially in time of war. In fact, at the outset of the
majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts said just this:
But the fact that legislation that raises armies is subject to
First Amendment constraints does not mean that we ignore
the purpose of this legislation when determining its
constitutionality; as we recognized in Rostker [v.
Goldberg],85 “judicial deference . . . is at its apogee” when
Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support
armies.86
But what the Court ignores is that such deference has almost
always in hindsight been regarded as a mistake. For example, few
Supreme Court decisions are regarded as more in error than
Korematsu v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of the
government’s evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the west coast
during World War II.87 Moreover, as the Third Circuit pointed out,
there is no need for such deference to the military with regard to the
Solomon Amendment.88 Never during the litigation did the
government offer a shred of evidence that law schools’ exclusion of
military recruiters had the slightest adverse effect on military
recruitment.
What now? Law schools, and their faculty and students, must
protest the military’s presence on campus and the military’s policy of
excluding gays and lesbians. The Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR
emphasized that law schools are free to express their own messages of
protest and disagreement with the military.89 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote: “Law schools remain free under the statute to express

85. 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
86. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting 453 U.S. at 70).
87. 323 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1944).
88. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1309 (“[T]he Third Circuit concluded that the Solomon
Amendment unconstitutionally compels law schools to accommodate the military's message.”).
89. Id. at 1307.
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whatever views they may have on the military’s congressionally
mandated employment policy, all the while retaining eligibility for
federal funds.”90 The Court added:
[The] Solicitor General acknowledg[ed] that law schools “could
put signs on the bulletin board next to the door, they could
engage in speech, they could help organize student protests” . . . .
[The Solomon Amendment] affects what law schools must do—
afford equal access to military recruiters not what they may or
may not say.91

Thus, law schools, and their faculty and students, are allowed to
protest the military’s presence on campus in any way they choose, so
long as they do not exclude the military. They need to do so and to
express their strong disagreement with the exclusion of gays and
lesbians from the military.
That, of course, is what all of this is about: a federal statute, based
on prejudice and stereotypes, that discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation. Efforts must concentrate on eliminating that law
and the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the military.
I have heard many say that FAIR and the other plaintiffs in the
suit were anti-military. In fact, the lawsuit is based on just the
opposite: the desire to allow more people to serve in the armed
forces. The lawsuit was brought by those who believe that their
schools should not facilitate discrimination. Rather, they should
adhere to long-standing policies that employers who discriminate are
not welcome in law schools. It is sad that the Court was so
insensitive to this interest and abandoned well-established First
Amendment principles out of its desire to defer to the military.

90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 25).
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